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NOTES
IMPEACHMENT WITH PRIOR CONVICTIONS UNDER
FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 609(a)(1):
A PLEA FOR BALANCE
At a time when criminal law reform is at a peak, Congress should
reconsider the unfair advantage given to criminal defendants under Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1),' governing the admissibility of prior
convictions. Consider the following hypothetical: A defendant, on trial
for kidnapping and murder, raises the defense of alibi, to which the ac-
cused and her witnesses will testify. All have prior felony convictions,
and the prosecutor plans to use certified records of these judgments for
impeachment purposes. The Government's case relies heavily on the tes-
timony of a witness who can refute the alibi. This witness, however, also
has a prior felony conviction, and defense counsel plans to use this evi-
dence to impeach.2
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1), the court must submit the
defendant's prior conviction, if not a crimen falsi,3 to a balancing test,
weighing the probative value of the conviction against any prejudicial
effect to the defendant.4 The admission of a defense witness' prior con-
victions often turns on the judge's interpretation of the legislative intent
1. Rule 609(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides:
(a) General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence
that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from him or established
by public record during cross-examination but only if the crime (1) was punishable by
death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted,
and the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its
prejudicial effect to the defendant,...
Several states have adopted identical or substantially similar versions of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. See 3 J. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 609[12] (1982).
2. The court may exclude from evidence prior convictions that are neither felonies nor crimen
falsi, see infra notes 3 & 64, are the subject of a pardon, or are the result of a juvenile adjudication.
FED. R. EvID. 609.
3. The term "crimenfalsi" refers to "crimes in the nature of perjury or subornation of perjury,
false statement, criminal fraud, embezzlement, false pretense, or any other offense which involves
deceitfulness, untruthfulness, or falsification bearing on the witness' propensity to testify truthfully."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 335 (5th ed. 1979).
Prior convictions for felonies that are crimen falsi are automatically admissible pursuant to rule
609(b). See infra note 47.
4. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1).
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underlying rule 609(a)(1).' Most courts hold that the prior convictions
of a prosecution witness are automatically admissible.
Rule 609(a)(1) creates a serious evidentiary imbalance, particularly in
cases in which parties rely heavily upon witnesses' credibility. The de-
fense may automatically impeach a government witness and yet conceal
the defendant's convictions and possibly those of the defense witnesses.
Prosecutors are at an obvious disadvantage.
Part I of this Note discusses the historical development of prior con-
viction impeachment.7 Part II reviews decisions construing rule
609(a)(1) as either granting or denying the accused an automatic right to
impeach.' Part III analyzes possible alternatives to the present rule and
offers an amendment to accommodate the significant policies implicated
by prior conviction impeachment.9 Finally, this Note concludes that
Congress should strike a fair balance between the accused's rights and
society's interest in law and order.10
I. THE EVOLUTION OF PRIOR CONVICTION IMPEACHMENT
A. Prior Convictions: From Disqualifying to Impeaching
Early common law forbade persons convicted of "infamous crimes"
from testifying in court." The common-law disqualification constituted
part of the punishment for the crime and also reflected the belief that an
ex-convict lacked credibility. 2 Absolute disqualification and the conse-
quent loss of evidence proved too impractical. Gradually, legislators and
judges reshaped the rule.3
In 1918, the Supreme Court in Rosen v. United States14 abolished the
common-law rule that a prior felony conviction disqualified a witness
from testifying. In Rosen, a convicted felon testified against his co-con-
5. See infra notes 54-64 and accompanying text.
6. See infra note 50 and accompanying text. But see infra notes 68-77 and accompanying text
(admission not automatic).
7. See infra notes 11-53 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 54-81 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 82-109 and accompanying text.
10. See infra note 110 and accompanying text.
11. C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 93 (3d ed. 1984). "Infamous crimes" include
treason, any felony, obstruction of justice, or any misdemeanor involving dishonesty. Id.
12. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 1, at 600-54.
13. See generally 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 488 (Chadbourn
rev. 1979) (collecting statutes dealing with witness qualifications).
14. 245 U.S. 467 (1918).
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spirator. 15 The Court reasoned that anyone with relevant information
should testify, allowing the fact-finder to determine the witness' credibil-
ity and the weight of his testimony.' 6 Under the theory espoused in Ro-
sen, a witness' prior convictions do not bear on competency, but rather
on credibility.
The use of prior convictions to impeach a witness' credibility has not
gained universal approval. Courts and commentators argue that proof of
past criminal conduct is not probative of a witness' honesty. 17 Moreover,
prior criminal conviction evidence may be highly prejudicial to the de-
fendant as a witness because the jury might convict him partly on the
basis of his past behavior. 8 A defendant with relevant information
therefore may be reluctant to testify. 19
Others argue that prior convictions serve as effective impeachment de-
vices. Justice Holmes provides the most frequently advanced rationale
for admitting prior crimes into evidence. A prior conviction, Justice
Holmes explained, displays a "general readiness to do evil," from which
the jury may "infer a readiness to lie in a particular case."20 Another
rationale for admitting prior convictions is that the jury has the right to
know a witness' background.2" Notwithstanding the arguments for and
against admitting prior convictions, this impeachment method remains
"firmly entrenched" in American law.22
15. Id. at 468-69.
16. Id. The Court believed that the common-law rule barring witnesses, made applicable to
federal courts by the Judiciary Act of 1789, was already "seriously shaken" by two earlier decisions.
Id. at 460 (citing Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892) and Benson v. United States, 146 U.S.
325 (1892)). In addition, the Court noted that the Federal Criminal Code of 1909 changed the
common-law rule by allowing persons convicted of perjury to testify. 245 U.S. at 471.
17. See State v. Boucher, 478 A.2d 218, 220 (Vt. 1984) ("the probative value of prior crimes for
evaluating credibility is suspect at best"); see also Nichol, Prior Crime Impeachment of Criminal
Defendants: A Constitutional Analysis of Rule 609, 89 W. VA. L. REv. 391, 407 (1980); Spector,
Rule 609: A Last Plea for Its Withdrawal, 32 OKLA. L. REv. 334, 345 (1979).
18. See, eg., 3 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE 317-18 (1979); MCCOR-
MICK, supra note 11, at 99; Note, To Take the Stand or Not to Take the Stand: The Dilemma of the
Defendant with a Criminal Record, 4 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 215 (1968) (generally discussing
the problems faced by an accused with a criminal record who wants to testify in his own behalf).
19. See MCCORMICK, supra note 11, at 557; Ladd, Credibility Tests-Current Trends, 89 U.
PA. L. REV. 166, 184 (1940).
20. Gertz v. Fichtburg R.R., 137 Mass. 77, 78 (1884).
21. See, e.g., United States v. Garber, 471 F.2d 212, 215 (5th Cir. 1972) ("the jury should be
informed about the character of a witness who asks the jury to believe his testimony"); State v.
Duke, 100 N.H. 292, 293, 123 A.2d 745, 746 (1956) (same).
22. See Note, supra note 18, at 219.
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B. Enter Judicial Discretion
Until 1975, federal common law, following the Supreme Court's gui-
dance in Rosen, determined the admissibility of prior convictions in all
federal circuits except the District of Columbia.23 Although federal
courts disagreed which convictions were admissible,24 all agreed that if
the conviction fell within a designated class, a court had no discretion to
exclude the prior conviction evidence.2" Automatic admissibility re-
ceived harsh criticism because of concern for prejudice to the defendant-
witness.26 Two District of Columbia Circuit decisions responded to the
criticism.
In Luck v. United States,27 the defendant appealed his housebreaking
and larceny convictions, arguing that the trial court erred by automati-
cally admitting his earlier juvenile conviction for grand larceny. The
prosecution asserted an automatic right to use the prior conviction.28
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, however, found that
the statute left room for "sound judicial discretion. ' 29  The court sug-
23. See, e.g., Henderson v. United States, 202 F.2d 400, 405-06 (6th Cir. 1953) (noting that
except when Congress or the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides otherwise, admissibility of evi-
dence shall be governed by the principles of common law).
In the District of Columbia, the statute governing prior crime impeachment read as follows:
No person shall be incompetent to testify, in either civil or criminal proceedings, by reason
of his having been convicted of crime, but such fact may be given in evidence to affect his
credibility as a witness, either upon the cross-examination of the witness or by evidence
aliunde; and the party cross-examining him shall not be concluded by his answers as to
such matters....
14 D.C. CODE ANN. § 305 (1961).
24. See Comment, Prior Conviction Evidence and Defendant Witnesses, 53 N.Y.U.L. REV.
1290, 1295-96 (1978). Almost all federal courts admitted prior felony convictions for impeachment.
Id. at 1295. The major disagreement centered over which misdemeanors, if any, were admissible.
The Ninth Circuit, for example, excluded all misdemeanors, while other circuits admitted them if
they involved moral turpitude or acts of dishonesty. Id.
25. Id. at 1296; see also FED. R. EvID. 609 advisory committee note ("The weight of traditional
authority has been to allow use of felonies generally, without regard to the nature of the particular
offense, and of crimen falsi without regard to the grade of the offense.").
26. See Comment, supra note 24, at 1296-97.
27. 348 F.2d 763, 764 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
28. Id. at 767. The prosecution in Luck offered a juvenile, rather than an adult, conviction to
impeach the defendant. The court first addressed the issue of whether a juvenile conviction was
admissible in this case before reaching the prosecution's claim of automatic admission. Writing for
the majority, Judge McGowan concluded that Congress did not withdraw juvenile offenses from the
choice of permissible impeachment devices. Id. at 766-67.
For the current attitude of Congress toward the use of juvenile offenses as a method of impeach-
ment, see FED. R. EvID. 609(d) ("generally not admissible").
29. 348 F.2d at 768. Judge McGowan examined the District of Columbia's impeachment stat-
ute, see supra note 23, and decided that the word "may" authorized discretion to "play upon the
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol63/iss3/6
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gested several factors for the trial court to consider on remand in decid-
ing whether to admit a prior conviction,3" concluding that the trial court
should "strike a reasonable balance between the interests of the defend-
ant and of the public."3
In Gordon v. United States,32 the District of Columbia Circuit again
elaborated on prior conviction impeachment. The defendant claimed
that while it was proper for him to impeach a government witness with a
prior conviction, it was improper for the government to impeach him
with his own criminal background.33 Writing for the court, then Judge
Burger found no plain error and refused to hold that the trial judge
abused his discretion, thus affirming the conviction.34 Relying on Luck,
Judge Burger suggested that the following factors govern admissibility of
prior conviction impeachment: (1) the nature of the prior crime; (2) the
age of the crime; (3) the similarity between the prior crime and the pres-
ent charge; and (4) the importance of the defendant's testimony.35 Be-
cause the decision in Gordon ultimately turned on the credibility of two
witnesses, the defendant and the complainant, admission of the prior
convictions was necessary to give the jury a balanced view of the
evidence.3 6
circumstances as they unfold in a particular case." Id. at 768. The court also reasoned that a trial
judge traditionally exercised discretion with respect to other areas of evidence. See id. at 768 n.8
(emphasizing that the Supreme Court, other jurisdictions, and model codes of evidence place great
weight on the trial court's discretion).
30. Id. at 769. Judge McGowan suggested that the following factors "might be relevant" in
considering the admission of a prior conviction: the nature of the prior crime; the number of convic-
tions; the age and circumstances of the defendant; and most importantly, the need for the defend-
ant's testimony. Id.
Subsequent decisions adopted these factors as the test for prior crime impeachment. See infra
notes 35 & 37 and accompanying text. Even after the Federal Rules of Evidence went into force, the
Luck factors continued to provide guidance for impeachment under rule 609(a)(1). See infra note
66.
31. 348 F.2d at 769-72. Dissenting in part, Judge Daneher reasoned that a party did not have
to use a conviction to impeach if there was one. In his opinion, however, if the conviction is offered
into evidence, "it is to be received," and the trial judge may not exclude the evidence. Id. at 771.
32. 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1029 (1968).
33. Id. at 938-39.
34. Id. The defendant sought to exclude the prior convictions because they were not within the
statutory meaning of "crimes." Because the trial judge "fully explored" this issue, the court con-
cluded that he did not abuse his discretion. Id. at 938 n.21.
35, Id. at 940-41. For a detailed analysis of each of the Gordon factors, see WEINSTEIN, supra
note 1, at 609[3] (1982). Despite the abandonment of the Luck-Gordon discretionary approach to
prior conviction impeachment, see infra notes 43 & 44 and accompanying text, courts still refer to
these factors when applying the balancing test in rule 609(a)(1). See infra note 49.
36. 383 F.2d at 941. The court stressed that the admission of both witnesses' convictions was
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In less than fifty years, prior conviction evidence in federal courts
progressed from grounds for disqualification to grounds for impeach-
ment, and from automatically admissible to admissible at the court's dis-
cretion. Nearly every circuit followed the Luck-Gordon approach,
approving the use of discretion in the absence of any statutory com-
mand.37 Congress chose to repudiate the Luck-Gordon legacy, however,
when it considered rule 609(a)(l). 38
C. Rule 609(a)(1) and its "Tortured Path"
In 1961, under the auspices of the Judicial Conference of the United
States, Chief Justice Warren appointed a special committee to examine
the possibility of codifying evidentiary rules for federal courts.39 The
committee determined that uniform rules were "advisable and feasi-
ble."'  An Advisory Committee began drafting two years later.
Drafts of rule 609(a)(1), governing the admissibility of prior convic-
tions, stirred enormous controversy. Following the pre-Luck-Gordon ap-
proach, the first draft of rule 609(a)(1) left no room for judicial
discretion, admitting felonies or crimen falsi against any witness.4 '
Sharply criticized for neglecting to consider prejudice to an accused with
a criminal record, the Committee offered a second draft that included
essential because the case was a "credibility contest," and not because of any "eye for an eye" atti-
tude toward impeachment. Id. at 938 n.2a & 941. Although the court did not point to the centrality
of credibility as a factor in its test, some commentators suggest that such centrality is a fifth factor in
the Gordon test. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 1, at 609-68 to -69; Surratt, Prior-Conviction Impeach-
ment Under the Federal Rules of Evidence: A Suggested Approach to Applying the "Balancing" Provi.
sion of Rule 609(a), 31 SYRACUSE L. REv. 907, 929-30, 939-40 (1980).
37. See Comment, Impeachment Through Introduction of Prior Criminal Record-The Penn-
sylvania Rule v. FederalRule of Evidence 609(a), 16 DUQ. L. REV. 73, 82-83 (1977) (collecting cases
following the Luck-Gordon approach).
38. See infra note 43 and accompanying text. For a thorough examination of prior conviction
impeachment from Luck to the House hearings on rule 609, see Tobias, Impeachment of the Accused
by Prior Conviction and the Proposed Federal Rules: The Tortured Path of Rule 609: Hearings on
H.R. 5463 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd
Cong., 1st Sess. 105-14 (1973) (Supp.) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
39. S. REP. No. 1277, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
7051 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
40. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 39, at 5.
41. The Advisory Committee's first version of rule 609(a) read as follows:
(a) General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence
that he has been convicted of a crime is admissible but only if the crime, (I) was punishable
by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was con-
victed, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement regardless of the punishment.
46 F.R.D. at 295-96 (1969).
[Vol. 63:469
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judicial discretion. 2 The inclusion of judicial discretion disturbed Con-
gress, however, because it claimed that a revision of the statute construed
in Luck repudiated the Luck-Gordon approach and its progeny.4 3 Ac-
cordingly, under enormous pressure the Advisory Committee submitted
its original proposal to Congress for approval. 4
In Congress, rule 609(a)(1) again faced considerable controversy. The
House, like the Advisory Committee, rejected judicial discretion, but also
limited impeachment to crimen falsi.45 The Senate's approach was
42. See Comment, The Interaction of Rules 609(a)(2) and 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence:
Can Evidence of a Prior Conviction Which Falls Within the Ambit of Rule 609(a)(2) Be Excluded by
Rule 403?, 50 U. CIN. L. REv. 380, 383-84 (1981). The Advisory Committee was aware of the
dilemma of an accused with a record but concluded that there existed no "acceptable alternative" to
the pre-Luck-Gordon approach of wide-open impeachment by prior crimes. See 46 F.R.D. at 299.
The Committee injected judicial discretion into a separate subsection to the rule. In full, the new
draft of rule 609(a) provided:
(a) General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence
that he has been convicted of a crime, except on a plea of nolo contendere, is admissible but
only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under
the law under which he was convicted or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement regard-
less of the punishment, unless (3), in either case, the judge determines that the probative
value of the evidence of the crime is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice.
Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates, 51
F.R.D. 315, 391 (1971). In a note to this proposal, the Advisory Committee made explicit reference
to Luck and Gordon as guides for applying the rule's discretionary standard. Id. at 393.
43. In response to civil disorder in Washington, D.C. during the 1960s, Congress passed the
District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 91-358, 84
Stat. 473. This act revised, among other things, the statute upon which Luck and Gordon based their
decision. Unlike the earlier provision that a prior crime "may be given" for impeachment purposes,
see supra note 23, the statute now stated that the crime "shall be admitted." See WEINSTEIN, supra
note 1, at 609-50 (citing the amended statute); see also Comment, supra note 42, at 382-83 (describ-
ing the reasons for and effects of this amendment).
Congress' modification of the word "may" to "shall" removed any discretion previously claimed
by the District of Columbia Circuit. This change of course had no binding effect on other circuits, as
they were free to formulate their own common-law rules of impeachment until the Federal Rules of
Evidence appeared.
44. After the Advisory Committee submitted its second draft of rule 609, embracing the Luck-
Gordon discretionary approach, Sen. McClellan proposed an amendment to the Rules Enabling Act,
28 U.S.C. § 2078, that would have limited the Committee's rulemaking power. See WEINSTEIN,
supra note 1, at 609-48 to -52. The Committee apparently took this congressional hint and resubmit-
ted its original draft. See Hearings, supra note 38, at 110.
For the final version of rule 609(a) that the Advisory Committee presented to Congress, see supra
note 41. In a note to the rule, the Committee explicitly rejected Luck and explained that the new
version "accord[ed] with the Congressional policy manifested" in the earlier amendment to the Dis-
trict of Columbia impeachment statute. Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magis-
trates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 269, 270 (1972).
45. The House initially amended the Advisory Committee's proposal to restore judicial discre-
tion when the offered conviction was a felony. See H.R. REP. No. 650, 93rd Cong., Ist Sess. 11,
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broader, admitting crimenfalsi and any felony.46 Eventually the Confer-
ence Committee resolved the conflict.
The Conference Committee agreed to exclude judicial discretion in
cases involving crimen fali. 4 7  This agreement resulted in rule
reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7051, 7084 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT].
The subcommittee's amendment read as follows:
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been
convicted of a crime is admissible only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or impris-
onment in excess of one year, unless the court determines that the danger of unfair preju-
dice outweighs the probative value of the evidence of the conviction, or (2) involved
dishonesty or false statement.
Id.
The full committee believed that the "danger of unfair prejudice" to the accused and to a witness
who was not the accused justified limiting impeachment only to crimes "bearing directly on credibil-
ity." See id. at 11. The House's final version of rule 609(a) read as follows:
Rule 609(a) General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evi-
dence that he has been convicted of a crime is admissible only if the crimes involved dis-
honesty or false statement.
120 CONG. REc. 1414 (1974).
46. The Senate Judiciary Committee, like the House, also proposed including judicial discretion
in its first draft. Rule 609(a), as submitted by the Judiciary Committee, provided:
(a) General rule.-For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence
that he has been convicted of a crime may be elicited from him or established by public
record during cross-examination but only if the crime (1) involved dishonesty or false state-
ment or (2) in the case of witnesses other than the accused, was punishable by death or
imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted, but only
if the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its
prejudicial effect.
120 CONG. REc. 37,076 (1974).
The Senate Judiciary Committee agreed with the House that the accused deserved special protec-
tion. With other witnesses, however, the Committee believed that any felony should be admissible,
subject to judicial discretion to exclude the felony in cases of prejudice to the party offering the
witness. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 39, at 14. The Senate proposed the following amendment
to the rule:
General rule.-For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he
has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from him or established by public
record during cross-examination but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or im-
prisonment in excess of 1 year under the law under which he was convicted or (2) involved
dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.
120 CONG. REc. 37,076 (1974) (emphasis added).
47. H.R. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 7051, 7102-3 [hereinafter cited as CONFERENCE REPORT]. The Conference Committee ex-
plained that crimen falsi "are particularly probative of credibility and, under this rule are always to
be admitted. Thus, judicial discretion.., is not applicable to those [crimes] involving dishonesty or
false statement." Id.
According to the Conference Committee, a crime involving "dishonesty or false statement," in-
cluded "perjury or subornation of perjury, false statement, criminal fraud, embezzlement, or false
pretense, or any other ... crimen falsi, the commission of which involves some element of deceit,
untruthfulness or falsification .... " Id.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol63/iss3/6
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609(a)(2).48 With respect to non-crimen falsi felonies, the Committee
chose a modified discretionary approach that focused on the "prejudicial
effect to the defendant."49 Rule 609(a)(1) incorporates this modification.
The Committee explained that rule 609(a)(1) permits a defendant to im-
peach a prosecution witness at any time, but requires a balancing test
whenever the defendant is the witness.50 In other words, the accused has
an automatic right to impeach with a prior conviction, but the prosecu-
tion does not. Moreover, the Committee suggested that impeachment of
a defense witness may prejudice the defendant, in which case the balanc-
ing test would also apply.5t
48. In pertinent part, rule 609(a)(2) provides: "For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a
witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if the crime ... (2) involved
dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment." FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2) (emphasis
added).
49. See CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 47, at 9-10. The Conference Committee explained
that only the prejudicial effect to the defendant warranted consideration. Prejudice to other wit-
nesses did not overcome the countervailing need for the fact-finder to have as much evidence as
possible. Id.
The Committee failed to explain, however, what factors were relevant in applying the balancing
test in rule 609(a)(1). Courts construing the rule have had no problem finding applicable factors.
They simply continue to examine those suggested by Luck and Gordon, see supra notes 30, 35-37 and
accompanying text. See, eg., United States v. Jackson, 627 F.2d 1198, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
United States v. Hayes, 553 F.2d 824, 828 (2d Cir. 1977).
50. The Committee's draft of rule 609(a)(1) seems to grant the accused an automatic right to
impeach with a prior conviction. The prosecution, however, does not have a similar right. Discuss-
ing rule 609(a)(1), Rep. Hungate explained that "in practical effect,. . . the prior felony conviction of
a prosecution witness may always be used. There can be no prejudicial effect to the defendant if he,
the defendant, impeaches the credibility of a prosecution witness." 120 CONG. REc. 40,891 (1974).
The prosecution, according to Rep. Hungate, has the burden of showing that the probative value of
the conviction outweighs any prejudice to the defendant. Id.
Rep. Dennis had similar views. He emphasized that the rule's balancing test contemplates only
"damage or prejudice to the defendant alone." Id. at 40,894. "[A] defendant can cross examine a
government witness about any of his previous felony convictions; he can always do it, because that
will not prejudice him in any way." Id. Rep. Dennis explained another, even more negative effect of
rule 609(a)(l): "Only the Government is going to be limited." Id.
51. Id. at 40,891. But see CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 47, at 9 ("The danger of prejudice
to a witness other than the defendant ... was considered and rejected by the Conference as an
element to be weighed in determining admissibility.").
Although no court has expressly found rule 609(a)(1) to require balancing the prior conviction of
a defendant's witness, some courts have suggested that the phrase "prejudicial effect to the defend-
ant" might include prior crimes of the defendant's witnesses. See, e.g., United States v. Lipscomb,
702 F.2d 1049, 1063 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (en banc) ("The jury may, however, still presume guilt or lack
of credibility of the defendant by association or may unduly discount the defense witness' testi-
mony."); Moore v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 575 F. Supp. 919, 921 (D. Md. 1983) (rule 609(a)(1), in
criminal trials, "protects criminal defendant[s] from prejudicial impeachment of defendant and de-
fense witnesses.").
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At least two policies appear throughout the evolution of rule 609(a)(1).
First, Congress wanted to encourage the testimony of an accused with a
criminal background, who might refuse to take the stand for fear of dam-
aging his case.52 Second, Congress believed that the judiciary must have
limited discretion to oversee the use of prior conviction impeachment.5 3
With these policies and its vacillating history, rule 609(a)(1) went into
force in 1975. Application of rule 609(a)(1), however, has been
inconsistent.
II. JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF RULE 609(a)(1)
A. The Defendant's Automatic Right
In United States v. Smith,54 the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia reversed a defendant's conviction because the trial judge failed
to apply the balancing test required under rule 609(a)(1). Focusing on
the changes caused by the rule, Smith became the first decision to declare
that an accused may automatically impeach prosecution witnesses with
prior convictions. 5' The court implied, however, that the automatic
right to impeach could be modified, noting that at least one court has
rejected automatic impeachment. 6 Nevertheless, courts continue to cite
Smith as authority for the defendant's automatic right to impeach with
prior convictions. 7
Two decisions in the Ninth Circuit have been particularly important in
fleshing out rule 609(a)(1). In United States v. Dixon,58 a conspiracy
52. See supra note 42.
53. See supra note 45 and accompanying text; see also infra note 92 and accompanying text
(discussing Congress' general view toward judicial discretion, as manifested throughout the Federal
Rules of Evidence).
54. 551 F.2d 348, 356-57 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
55. Id. at 359 n.21. Describing the changes in prior crime impeachment brought about by rule
609, the Smith court claimed that the rule "reflects a deliberate choice to regulate impeachment by
prior conviction only where the defendant's interests might be damaged .. . and not where the
prosecution might suffer...." Id. at 359. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
The court contrasted rule 609(a)(1) with the Luck approach, noting that under Luck, the "discre-
tionary standard was equally applicable to all witnesses and parties." Id.
56. Footnote 21 of the Smith court's opinion acknowledges that United States v. Jackson, 405
F. Supp. 938 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) "fashioned a significant modification" of the rule that a defendant
may automatically impeach with a prior crime. 551 F.2d at 359 n.21.
57. See, eg., United States v. Martin, 562 F.2d 673, 680-81 n.16 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Recently,
the District of Columbia Circuit reaffirmed its position that under rule 609(a)(1) the defendant has
an automatic right to impeach with prior crimes. United States v. Lipscomb, 702 F.2d 1049, 1058
n.37 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
58. 547 F.2d 1079, 1081-83 (9th Cir. 1976). The defendants called a government informant,
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trial, the defendants offered to impeach a government informant with
four prior convictions. The judge admitted only one.59 On appeal, the
court reversed the defendant's convictions, reasoning that the trial court
had no discretion to apply rule 609(a)(1)'s balancing test when the de-
fendant, rather than the prosecution, sought to impeach a witness with
prior convictions.' °
In United States v. Nevitt,61 the defendant sought to impeach a prose-
cution witness with prior convictions, but the trial judge excluded the
evidence. The Ninth Circuit reversed the defendant's conviction, empha-
sizing the "rule" of automatic admission.62 The court added that the
defendant's right to impeach a prosecution witness is protected by the
confrontation clause of the sixth amendment. 63 The Nevitt court implied
that no "confrontation problems" will arise as long as the accused enjoys
Porter, who had not been called by the prosecution. During a pretrial conference, the defense coun-
sel notified the court that he planned to introduce Porter's prior convictions for robbery, two forger-
ies and a drug offense, for impeachment. Id. at 1081.
59. Id. The trial court admitted only the narcotics conviction. Despite the fact that all of the
prior convictions were less than ten years old, the trial court excluded the robbery and one forgery
conviction, claiming they were too old. Id.
60. Id. at 1083. The Dixon court framed its rule 609(a)(1) argument around the robbery con-
viction only, choosing to discuss the forgery convictions within the framework of rule 609(a)(2). Id.
at 1083-84. Addressing the exclusion of the robbery conviction, the court first noted that because
the conviction was less than ten years old, rule 609(b) did not apply. Id. at 1083. The effect of
introducing this evidence "could only have benefited the defendants." Id. The Government tried to
argue that the exclusions were harmless error. The Dixon court disagreed, explained how the im-
peachment might have developed, and then concluded that the "prejudice in not permitting [defend-
ants] to exercise their undoubted right to impeach is therefore established." Id. at 1084.
The Dixon court suggested that a prior conviction of a non-defendant witness might be excluded
under rule 403. Id. at 1083 n.4. But see infra note 67 (explaining inapplicability of rule 403 to
criminal cases involving prior crime impeachment).
The hesitancy with which both Smith and Dixon acknowledge the defendant's automatic right to
impeach under rule 609(a)(1) suggests that the courts were aware of the potential imbalance created
by rule 609(a)(1).
61. 563 F.2d 406, 408 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 847 (1979). In his trial for securi-
ties violations, Nevitt wanted to impeach the Goverhment's only witness with a prior conviction.
The trial judge refused to admit the profferred conviction because the conviction did not "go to
falsity" and Nevitt's counsel did not produce a copy of the conviction. Id.
62. Id. at 408-09 ("The defendant may always use prior felony convictions of a prosecution
witness."). The Nevitt court, however, made no reference to legislative history for the defendant's
right to impeach. Instead, the court focused solely on the rule's plain language. The court con-
cluded that rule 609(a)(1) "limits the balancing test to determining prejudicial effect to the defend-
ant." Id. at 409.
63. Id. at 408-09. The constitutional dimension suggested by the Nevitt court has its roots in
the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment, which provides that "[in] all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him .... " U.S.
CONST. amend. VI. See infra notes 102 & 103 and accompanying text.
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an absolute right to impeach.' 4
Most courts follow the Smith, Dixon, and Nevitt trilogy, holding that
rule 609(a)(1) gives a court no discretion to exclude crimes falling under
rule 609 that are offered by the accused for impeachment purposes.6"
The majority view, however, creates an imbalance inadequately consid-
ered by Congress when it formulated rule 609(a)(1). In "credibility con-
tests," the defendant enjoys a significant advantage because the
convictions of the prosecution's witness are automatically admissible, yet
the defendant's conviction must go through a balancing test already
weighted in his favor.66 Courts have recognized the potential for
inequity.67
64. 563 F.2d at 408.
65. See, e.g., United States v. Lipscomb, 702 F.2d 1049, 1058 & n.37 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (en
banc); Government of the Virgin Islands v. Carino, 631 F.2d 226, 229-30 (3d Cir. 1980); United
States v. Martin, 562 F.2d 673, 680-81 n.16 (D.C. Cir. 1977); United States v. Ortega, 561 F.2d 803,
806 (9th Cir. 1977). See supra note 2 (discussing rule 609 requirements).
Many commentators agree that rule 609(a)(1) affords no discretion to exclude qualifying crimes
offered by the accused for impeachment purposes. See, e.g., M. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
EVIDENCE 476-77 (1981); MCCORMICK, supra note 11, at 91; Surratt, Prior-Conviction Impeachment
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence: A Suggested Approach to Applying the "Balancing" Provision of
Rule 609(a), 31 SYRACUSE L. REV. 907, 921 n.57 (1980); Note, Impeachment by Prior Conviction:
Adjusting to Federal Rule of Evidence 609, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 416, 423 (1979); Comment, Im-
peachment Through Introduction of Prior Criminal Record-The Pennsylvania Rule v. Federal Rule
of Evidence 609(a), 16 DUQ. L. REV. 73, 91 (1977); Note, Protection of Defendants Under Federal
Rule of Evidence 609(a): Is the Rule an Endangered Species?, 31 RUTGERS L. REV. 908, 927 (1979).
66. The imbalance created by the protection afforded an accused by rule 609(a)(1) is obvious
when compared with rule 403. Rule 403 also contains a balancing test giving the court discretion to
exclude prejudicial evidence. The rule provides for exclusion when the evidence's "probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice .... FED. R. EVID. 403. In other
words, rule 403 favors admission of evidence, excluding it only when prejudice "substantially out-
weighs" the probative value. In rule 609(a)(1), however, the balancing test is reversed, favoring
exclusion of the prior crime unless its probative value outweighs any prejudice to the defendant. See
supra note 1 (text of rule 609(a)(1)). Because this reverse test applies only to a defendant, and
because any other witness' prior crime is either automatically admitted by rule 609 or will likely
come in under rule 403, an accused has a definite trial advantage from the outset.
67. For example, in United States v. McCray, 15 M.J. 1086 (A.C.M.R. 1983), a military court
held that the trial judge did not err by refusing to permit impeachment of prosecution witnesses with
prior crimes. Because all of the witnesses had prior convictions, id. at 1088 n.2, the review court
believed that there existed a "danger of confusing the issues and misleading the members [of the
court-martial panel] by adventuring into a comparison of the relative heinousness of the witnesses'
crimes .... " Id. at 1089. The court concluded that "impeachment of the government's witnesses
was properly restricted in this case under Rule 403." Id.
Other courts similarly have suggested that rule 403 could operate to exclude prior crimes of wit-
nesses other than the accused. See, e.g., United States v. Toney, 615 F.2d 277, 283-84 (5th Cir.)
(Tuttle, L, dissenting), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 985 (1980); United States v. Dixon, 547 F.2d 1079,
1083 n.4 (9th Cir. 1976); Tussel v. Witco Chem. Corp., 555 F. Supp. 979, 984 (W.D. Pa. 1983). But
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol63/iss3/6
Number 3] IMPEACHMENT WITH PRIOR CONVICTIONS
B. Restoring the Balance: Conditioning Automatic Admissibility
In United States v. Jackson,6" the District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York granted a motion in limine by the defendant, on trial
for armed robbery, to exclude evidence of a prior assault conviction.
Writing for the court, Judge Weinstein, in an exhaustive analysis of rule
609(a)(1), balanced the competing policies underlying the admissibility of
prior conviction evidence. 69  According to Judge Weinstein, a court
should attempt to reconcile the desire for a defendant to testify, despite
the defendant's criminal record,70 with the policy of "protecting the gov-
ernment's case against unfair misrepresentation of an accused's non-
criminality."7 1 Implying a dislike of prior conviction impeachment,
Judge Weinstein issued a preliminary ruling excluding the defendant's
prior assault conviction.72
see Diggs v. Lyons, 741 F.2d 577, 582 (3d Cir. 1984) (rule 403 does not modify the mandatory
provisions of rule 609(a)(1)); cf United States v. Toney, 615 F.2d 277, ;280 (5th Cir.) ("Rule 403
simply has no application where impeachment is sought through a crimen falsi."), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 985 (1980).
McCray and other courts are correct in recognizing that rule 609(a)(1) is overly restrictive in
requiring the automatic admission of prior crimes of non-defendant witnesses. Their use of rule 403
to remedy this problem, however, is incorrect. As the Advisory Committee explains, rule 403 "is
designed as a guide for the handling of situations for which no specific rules have been formulated."
FED. R. EvID. 403 advisory committee note. Rule 609(a)(1) is a "specific rule" stating that a prior
crime, if admissible, "shall be admitted," thus giving the court discretion to exclude prior crimes
only if they will prejudice the defendant.
68. 405 F. Supp. 938, 939 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
69. Id. at 939-42; see also id. at 940-41 (carefully reviewing legislative history).
70. Id. at 942.
71. Id. Concern for the government's case, articulated here by Judge Weinstein, was a minor
factor in Congress' formulation of the Federal Rules of Evidence. It should have been an important
concern. Only Rep. Hogan appears to have foreseen the present imbalance: "The rules of evidence
should not permit a witness to testify on behalf of a criminal defendant with the appearance of an
unblemished citizen, whereas in fact that witness has been convicted of felonies." 120 CONG. Rnc.
2376 (1974) (Rep. Hogan).
72. 405 F. Supp. at 942. Judge Weinstein explained that "in the abstract, prior assaultive con-
duct would seem to have little bearing on the likelihood that one will tell the truth." Id. He also
remarked that a prior conviction could not be offered simply to show that the defendant has a "bad"
character and therefore probably is guilty of the present charge. Id. (citing FED. R. EviD. 404(b),
prohibiting the introduction of specific acts evidence merely to show conduct "in conformity there-
with").
Other evidence introduced by the prosecution included photographs of a male resembling Jackson
at the bank and witnesses who would testify that the bank robbery involved a male resembling
Jackson. Id. Some of Jackson's co-conspirators also agreed to testify for the prosecution, although
Judge Weinstein noted that at least one of these possible government witnesses had a criminal rec-
ord.
Had there not been additional evidence and had the case come down to a "credibility contest,"
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Judge Weinstein conditioned the inadmissibility of the defendant's
prior conviction, however, on two distinct nonoccurrences. First, he
warned that any suggestion by the defendant of an unblemished past
might warrant the subsequent admission of his prior conviction. 7" Sec-
ond, Judge Weinstein instructed the defense counsel to refrain from im-
peaching the Government's witnesses with any prior convictions without
the court's prior approval.74 Judge Weinstein's unique modification of a
defendant's traditionally automatic right to impeach with prior convic-
tions ensured that the jury would receive a balanced presentation of the
evidence. The defendant thus was unable to take "unfair advantage" of
the rule's protection.75 Judge Weinstein also argued that rule 102 al-
lowed creative interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 76 In
short, he concluded, both conditions "promote growth and development
in the law of evidence in the interests of justice and reliable fact-
finding." 77
Judge Weinstein's approach in Jackson received mixed reactions.78
Occasionally, courts cite Jackson for the proposition that a balanced
Judge Weinstein might have faced a dilemma. Before rule 609(a)(1), he could have analogized to
Gordon and admitted the convictions of all witnesses. After rule 609(a)(1), however, this approach
is inapposite.
73. The suggestion of an innocent background, Judge Weinstein reasoned, might warrant ad-
mission of the defendant's prior conviction to remedy the "unfair trial advantage" wrongly obtained
by the defendant. 405 F. Supp. at 943. Essentially, the prior convictions would become admissible
because the "probative value" of the convictions would outweigh any "prejudicial effect to the de-
fendant." Judge Weinstein phrases his conclusion in the language of rule 609(a)(1), see supra note 1,
to show how the "probative significance" of Jackson's conviction could cause the balancing test to
weigh in favor of admission. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. This second condition ensured that thejury would receive a balanced presentation of the
evidence: "Proof that the government's witnesses have criminal records may cause the jury to un-
derestimate their credibility relative to the defendant's, again on the basis of incomplete or distorted
information." Id. The second condition also represented the fairest way to apportion the "impact of
the loss of evidence" caused by the exclusion of Jackson's prior conviction. Id.
76. FED. R. EVID. 102 provides: "These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in adminis-
tration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of
the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined."
77. 405 F. Supp. at 943. Judge Weinstein acknowledged that rule 609(a)(1) protects defendants
rather than the government. He asserted, however, that courts have a major role in balancing these
competing interests. Id.
78. Compare Curran, Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a), 49 TEMP. L.Q. 890, 896-97 (1976) (ap-
proving Jackson); Note, Impeachment by Prior Criminal Conviction-Federal Rule of Evidence 609,
27 DRAKE L. Rnv. 326, 345 (1977) (same); and Comment, Proposed Rule of Evidence 609: Im-
peachment of Criminal Defendants by Prior Convictions, 54 WASH. L. REV. 117, 129-30 (1978)
(same) with United States v. Brown, 409 F. Supp. 890, 892 (W.D.N.Y. 1976) ("I consider ...
Jackson to be astray").
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presentation of the evidence is crucial for a fair trial.79 Although reach-
ing a commendable result, Jackson is unprecedented. Moreover, Judge
Weinstein's reliance on rule 102 was inappropriate. Rule 102 permits
judicial innovation only in "new and unanticipated situations."8 Rule
609(a)(1) directly addresses the evidentiary issues in Jackson. Accord-
ingly, the court was compelled to abide by the express language, however
ill-considered, of rule 609(a)(1). 81
Jackson nevertheless highlights an important policy inadequately con-
sidered by Congress: protecting the prosecutor's case. Rule 609(a)(1), as
enacted, frustrates this policy. The deficiency of rule 609(a)(1) should be
resolved by an appropriate amendment.
III. THE "TORTURED PATH" REVISITED
Several approaches to prior conviction impeachment are possible, as
the history of rule 609(a)(1) demonstrates.82 The remainder of this Note
examines some of these approaches and offers, as an alternative, an
amendment to rule 609(a)(1) that attempts to harmonize the competing
policies underlying prior conviction impeachment.
A. Absolute Exclusion of Any Convictions
Some jurisdictions impose an absolute bar against using prior convic-
tions to impeach a criminal defendant.83 An absolute bar, however, is
79. See, eg., United States v. Ortiz, 553 F.2d 782, 785 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 434 U.S. 897
(1977); United States v. McCray, 15 M.J. 1086, 1090 (A.C.M.R. 1983); cf United States v. Dixon,
547 F.2d 1079, 1083 nn.3 & 4 (9th Cir. 1976) (citing Jackson in one footnote and remarking in the
other footnote that rule 403 might exclude the conviction of a witness other than the defendant).
80. See HEARINGS, supra note 49, at 4 (letter by Edward W. Cleary, Reporter to the Advisory
Committee on Rules of Evidence); see also WEINSTEIN, supra note 1, at 102-12 (rule 102 provides
flexibility to problems not explicitly covered by the rules).
It is ironic that in Jackson, Judge Weinstein seems to ignore his own admonition about rule 102
that he includes in his treatise on evidence. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 1, at % 609[06]. Even more
ironic, however, is that in his treatise Judge Weinstein fails to cite Jackson for the proposition that
the defendant's right to impeach under rule 609 is not absolute. Instead, Judge Weinstein asserts
that prior convictions are always admissible against a prosecution witness. Id.
81. Judge Weinstein cites the Conference Report, see supra note 47, but ignores the language
referring to the defendant's right to impeach. 405 F. Supp. at 941.
82. See supra notes 41-51 and accompanying text.
83. See MCCORMICK, supra note 11, at 100 nn.48 & 49 (collecting statutes); see, eg., KAN. CIV.
PROC. CODE ANN. § 60-421 (Vernon 1965): "If the witness be the accused in a criminal proceeding,
no evidence of his conviction of a crime shall be admissible for the sole purpose of impairing his
credibility unless he has first introduced evidence admissible solely for the purpose of supporting his
credibility."
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more unfair to the prosecution's case than the current federal rule. At
least under rule 609(a)(1), admissibility of the defendant's prior convic-
tion depends on the balance of several considerations. An absolute bar
against admitting the defendant's convictions gives the jury a one-sided
view of the evidence.
Another alternative would exclude prior convictions against all wit-
nesses. 4 An absolute bar for all witnesses would be an even-handed and
manageable approach and would also encourage the testimony of an ac-
cused with a criminal past. Such an approach, however, would deprive
the jury of potentially relevant evidence about the credibility of the ac-
cused or any other witness.8 5
B. Admissibility of Crimen Falsi Only
Similar to the previous approach, a rule admitting only crimen falsi
would be easy to apply.8 6 The problem with this approach is defining
which offenses are crimen falsi. Despite the congressional definition of
crimen falsi as crimes involving "dishonesty or false statement," courts
freely admit crimes not within this definition. 7 Also, some crimes
outside the strict meaning of crimen falsi will be excluded despite their
probative value of the witness' credibility. For instance, assault may not
implicate a person's honesty directly, but it still reveals a disregard for
the law, thereby diminishing the witness' overall credibility. 8
84. See supra text accompanying note 12 (discussing common-law rule of disqualification of ex-
convicts). Arguably, the Federal Rules of Evidence follow an approach that excludes all prior con-
victions. Rule 404(b) prohibits the use of specific acts "to prove the character of a person in order to
show that he acted in conformity therewith." FED. R. EVID. 404(b). See generally Kuhns, The
Propensity to Misunderstand the Character of Specific Acts Evidence, 66 IowA L. REV. 777, 796-803
(1981) (discussing rule 404(b)). By introducing a prior conviction for impeachment, a party is ask-
ing the fact-finder, in effect, to conclude that the witness is of bad character and therefore is lying on
the stand. See supra text accompanying note 18. Thus, either the Rules are inconsistent on this
point, or rule 609(a) creates an exception to rule 404(b). See Nichol, supra note 17, at 406-7.
85. See HEARINGS, supra note 38, at 96 (statement by Edward W. Cleary).
86. See MCCORMICK, supra note 11, at 93-94. Congress considered, but rejected, this approach
as a general rule. See supra note 45. Instead, Congress codified this approach as rule 609(a)(2). See
supra note 48.
87. Compare the Conference Committee's definition of crimes "involving dishonesty or false
statement," supra note 47, with, e.g., United States v. Brown, 603 F.2d 1022, 1029 (1st Cir. 1979)
(burglary and petit larceny); United States v. Apuzzo, 555 F.2d 306, 307 (2d Cir. 1977) (misde-
meanor conviction for possession and transportation of untaxed cigarettes), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
916 (1978); and United States v. Bianco, 419 F. Supp. 507, 509 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (armed robbery and
breaking and entering), af'd, 547 F.2d 1164 (5th Cir. 1977).
88. See HEARINGS, supra note 38, at 96; see also Brown v. United States, 370 F.2d 242, 244
(D.C. Cir. 1966) (anti-social conduct probative of character trait of honesty); E. IMWINKELRIED,
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C. Unmodified Judicial Discretion
Before the enactment of rule 609(a)(1), the Luck-Gordon approach en-
trusted prior conviction impeachment to the trial judge's sound discre-
tion.89 A case-by-case determination, however, affords little certainty to
parties hoping to impeach with prior convictions.9" In fact, Congress
specifically curtailed the use of judicial discretion in rule 609(1) to ac-
comodate the need for certainty.91 On the other hand, Congress gener-
ously provided for judicial discretion throughout the Federal Rules of
Evidence.92 Unmodified judicial discretion therefore fails to balance the
need for certainty with the desirability of judicial discretion.
D. A Proposed Amendment
The following proposed version of rule 609(a)(1) would accommodate
the significant policies underlying prior conviction impeachment:93
(a) General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a wit-
ness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if
elicited from him or established by public record during cross-examination
but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess
of one year under the law under which he was convicted, and the court
determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence (A) outweighs
any prejudice to the accused, or (B) outweighs any unfair prejudice to the
prosecution, ....
The proposed amendment addresses Congress' major concerns when it
EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS 39-40 (1980) (willingness to disobey social norms strengthens infer-
ence that witness is violating another norm by lying on the stand). During the debates on rule 609(a)
in Congress, Sen. McClellan adamantly insisted that non-crimen falsi felonies bore upon a person's
honesty. See 120 CONG. REC. 37,076-77 (1974).
89. See supra notes 27-38 and accompanying text.
90. See 120 CONG. REc. 2380 (1974) (remarks by Rep. Hogan) (criticizing the Luck approach
and offering, instead, an amendment that would have removed any discretion in rule 609).
91. Cf S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 1-5 (1982)
(desire for certainty was a major impetus behind the push for codifying evidentiary rules); MCCOR-
MICK, supra note 11, at 99 (introduction of prior convictions based solely on judicial discretion has
"the disadvantage of uncertainty").
92. For examples of judicial discretion in the Rules, see FED. R. EvID. 102 (purpose and con-
struction of the Rules); FED. R. EvID. 201(c) (judicial notice); FED. R. EVID. 403 (excluding evi-
dence for prejudice, confusion, or waste of time); FED. R. EVID. 412(3) (evidence in rape cases);
FED. R. EvID. 611 (mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence); FED. R.
EVID. 614(a) (calling of witnesses by the court); FED. R. EVID. 706 (court-appointed experts); FED.
R. EvID. 803(24) (catch-all hearsay exception); and FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(5) (same).
93. The proposed amendment would leave unchanged rule 609(a)(2), dealing with crimenfalsi,
because this part of rule 609 applies evenly to all parties.
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drafted rule 609(a)(1): protecting the accused and encouraging testi-
mony.94 Subpart (1)(A) of the proposed amendment bolsters concern for
the accused by substituting the word "accused" for "defendant." 95 Sub-
part (1)(B) serves the equally important interest of promoting an eviden-
tiary balance between the accused and the prosecution96 by giving the
court discretion to consider prejudice to the prosecution's case. At the
same time, subpart (1)(B) protects the rights of the accused by requiring
the prosecution to prove unfair prejudice as opposed to any prejudice.
Consideration of prejudice to the prosecution undoubtedly conflicts
with Congress' position in rule 609(a)(1), 97 but is consistent with Con-
gress' liberal grant of discretion elsewhere in the Rules.98 The proposed
amendment also is consistent with language in the Rules specifically ad-
dressing prosecutorial concerns. 99 Subpart (1)(B) reduces the uncer-
tainty that broader discretion might produce by using the words "unfair
prejudice. ' '"" ° Judges and attorneys should already be familiar with the
type of balancing required by this phrase, because rules 403 and 412(3)
contain identical language.
101
94. For an example of a rule embodying a similar, balanced approach towards impeachment by
non-crimenfalsi felonies, see UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 609(a)(l)(court may consider prejudice
to "a party or the witness").
95. Cf. MILITARY R. EVID. 609(a)(1) (substituting "accused" for "defendant"); see also supra
note 83 (statute specifically using the word "accused" rather than "defendant" in affording protec-
tion to the accused).
The substitution of the word "accused" will also reduce uncertainty over rule 609(a)'s application
to civil as well as criminal defendants. See, eg., Tussel v. Witco Chem. Corp., 555 F. Supp. 979, 983
(W.D. Pa. 1983) (intended focus of rule 609(a)(1) was the concern for prejudice to criminal
defendants).
96. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 49 & 50 and accompanying text.
98. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
99. If an accused offers witnesses who testify that he is of good character, he "opens the door"
to attacks upon his character from the prosecution. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1). Similarly, if the
accused suggests that his alleged victim was of bad character or alleges self-defense in a homicide
case, the prosecution may introduce contrary evidence about the victim's character. FED. R. EViD.
404(a)(2). Also, while public policy usually requires excluding evidence of compromise or offers to
compromise a claim, the Rules allow the prosecution to introduce such evidence to prove "an effort
to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution." FED. R. EVID. 408; see also infra note 101 (rule
412 accommodates the prosecution by allowing courts to exclude certain evidence in rape trials).
100. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. The Advisory Committee used this language
when it included judicial discretion in the second draft of rule 609(a). See supra note 42. The House
Subcommittee on Reform of Criminal Laws also used "unfair prejudice" in its draft of the rule. See
supra note 45.
101. In rape cases, for example, the court has discretion to admit past sexual behavior of the
victim, offered by the accused, if it determines that "the probative value of such evidence outweighs
the danger of unfair prejudice." FED. R. EVID. 412(3) (emphasis added). Although the main pur-
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Some courts might be reluctant to limit impeachment for fear of violat-
ing the accused's right to confrontation.10 2 The Supreme Court has
stated that the "right to confront and to cross-examine is not absolute
and may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate in-
terests in the criminal trial process."' °3 Society has a "legitimate inter-
est" in an even-handed administration of criminal justice."°4 A balanced
presentation of evidence, as proposed in the amendment, promotes this
interest. Thus, under general constitutional principles, the amendment
does not violate the confrontation clause.
In Davis v. Alaska,I°5 the Supreme Court specifically dealt with the use
of prior convictions, finding that the State violated an accused's right to
confrontation when it denied him the opportunity to prove a witness'
bias by introducing a prior juvenile conviction.10 6 Although Davis dealt
pose of rule 412 is to protect the rape victim from unnecessary disclosure of her private life, Congress
recognized that "society's interest in a fair trial" requires excluding an accused's evidence in some
cases. See 124 CONG. REc. 34,913 (1973) (remarks by Rep. Mann); see also supra note 66 (citing
relevant text of rule 403). For examples of how courts construe the phrase "unfair prejudice," see J.
COTCHETF & A. ELKIND, FEDERAL COURTROOM EVIDENcE 45-46 (1983); GRAHAM, supra note
65, at 183-84 (collecting cases).
A note to the proposed amendment should include an approving reference to Jackson, discussed
supra notes 68-81, giving judges a sound example of the rule's application.
102. See supra notes 63 & 64 and accompanying text (claiming the right to impeach is constitu-
tionally compelled).
103. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973).
104. See United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364 (1981) ("[W]e have implicitly recognized
the necessity for preserving society's interest in the administration of criminal justice."); see also
Rushen v. Spain, 104 S. Ct. 453, 455 (1983) (citing Morrison for the same proposition). In United
States v. Lipscomb, 702 F.2d 1049 (D.C. Cir. 1983), Judge MacKinnon rendered a thoughtful opin-
ion on prior crime impeachment:
Fairness is not a one-way street and in the search for truth it is a legitimate concern that
one who testifies should not be allowed to appear as credible when his criminal record of
major crimes suggests that he is not.... [Advocates of fair play for the criminal] lose sight
entirely of society's right to have major criminals convicted and of the necessity that wit-
nesses, both for the prosecution and the defendant, not be permitted to appear as credible
when in fact they may not be. They also completely lose sight of the fact that our criminal
law, when viewed as a whole, already affords the accused far more rights than do the laws
of any other nation.
Id. at 1077-78 (MacKinnon, J., concurring); cf CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(f) (California voters, by
initiative measure, amended the state constitution to include "The Victims' Bill of Rights," that
provides, inter alia, that "[a]ny prior felony conviction of any person in any criminal proceeding,
whether adult or juvenile, shall subsequently be used without limitation for purposes of
impeachment .... ).
105. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
106. Id. at 320. At his trial for burglary and grand larceny, Davis sought to introduce the
juvenile record of a prosecution witness to establish bias. Id. at 319. Davis' theory was that evidence
of the prior record might create an inference that the witness was under pressure to testify for the
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with bias imp.eachment rather than conviction impeachment, Chief Jus-
tice Burger explained that a prior conviction could provide either a "gen-
eral" attack on a witness' credibility or, as in Davis, a more "particular"
attack directed toward revealing bias, prejudice, or ulterior motives. 107
Although a prior conviction used for a "particular" attack is always rele-
vant and admissible, the same is not true for a "general" attack.108
Amended rule 609(a)(1) will operate within the constitutional frame-
work that Davis created. If the accused offers a prior crime for a "partic-
ular" attack, a court must follow Davis and admit the evidence. If the
crime is offered for a "general" credibility attack, a court is free to exer-
cise its discretion within the confines of the amended rule. At least two
decisions since Davis have used the "general-particular" distinction to
limit an accused's examination of a witness with prior convictions and
arrests. 10 9 Thus, the proposed amendment not only accommodates all of
the major interests at stake, but also should survive constitutional
scrutiny.
IV. CONCLUSION
Impeachment is a two-way street.110 Congress, in drafting rule
prosecution because of his probationary status. Id. at 317-18. The trial court excluded the evidence.
Id. at 311. The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed Davis' conviction, asserting the state's interest in
protecting the anonymity of juvenile offenders. Id. at 314-15.
107. Id. at 316.
108. Id. After explaining the "general-particular" distinction, Chief Justice Burger concluded:
"[Partiality of a witness is subject to exploration at trial, and is 'always relevant as discrediting the
witness and affecting the weight of his testimony.' ... We have recognized that the exposure of a
witness' motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected
right of cross-examination." Id. at 316-17 (citations omitted).
Justice Stewart wrote, "I would emphasize that the Court neither holds nor suggests that the
Constitution confers a right in every case to impeach the general credibility of a witness through
cross-examination about his past delinquency adjudications or criminal convictions." 415 U.S. 308,
321 (1974) (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart's language provides express support for the
proposed amendment. Moreover, decisions not allowing the accused to impeach a witness with a
prior conviction have referred to Justice Stewart's concurrence in Davis for additional support. See
infra note 109.
109. See People v. Batista, 115 Misc.2d 1048, 1053-54, 454 N.Y.S.2d 1009, 1013 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1982) (denying the accused's use of the complainant's arrest record for impeachment and comment-
ing on the permissibility of limiting cross-examination relating to prior convictions); People v. Cony-
ers, 86 Misc.2d 752, 754, 758-62, 382 N.Y.S.2d 437, 441-44 (Sup. Ct. 1976), aff'd, 405 N.Y.S.2d 409
(App. Div. 1978) (denying the accused's use of the complainant's prior prostitution convictions for
impeachment in a rape trial).
110. SALTZBURG & REDDEN, supra note 72, at 365; see also supra note 103 (discussing
Lipscomb).
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609(a)(1), went too far and granted the accused an evidentiary windfall
to the detriment of the prosecutor."1 ' Even if the rights of the accused
outweigh society's interest in punishing criminals, both policies can still
operate simultaneously. Rule 609(a)(1) and its history, however, leave
courts powerless to safeguard the societal interest. The amendment pro-
posed in this Note offers a necessary and workable solution to this
imbalance.
Christian A. Bourgeacq
111. See Curran, supra note 78, at 895; Note, supra note 78, at 345.
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